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The State of Maine 
and the New Navy, 1889-1893 
by
Donald A. Yerxa
When Benjamin Harrison became President in March 
of 1889, an effective American naval arm was virtually 
nonexistent. The bulk of the ships of the United States 
Navy were antiquated, wooden-hulled cruisers. In light 
of the rapid advances in naval technology of the 1870s 
and 1880s, they were woefully obsolete. The Chester A. 
Arthur and Grover Cleveland administrations of the 
1880s had taken hesitant steps toward the creation of a 
modern steel navy. But the New Navy did not actually 
get under way until the Harrison administration of 
1889-1893.
The years of the Harrison administration witnessed a 
genuine naval renaissance. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s philo­
sophy of sea power was popularized in his The Influ­
ence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published in 
1890. Newspapers, popular magazines, and specialized 
naval journals printed a great volume of literature, most 
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of which focused on the need for a modernized navy. 
Many seaport newspaper editors, legislators from coastal 
states, and naval experts claimed that expanding Ameri­
can commercial activity as well as the nation’s coastal cit­
ies demanded naval protection and that the existing na­
val forces definitely were unable to supply adequate de­
fense. Responding to the validity and popularity of these 
arguments, Congress passed appropriation legislation 
which funded the construction of four battleships, three 
cruisers, five gunboats, and one ram vessel.
The State of Maine played a major role in the so-called 
naval renaissance of the early 1890s. Maine’s Congression­
al delegation not only voted consistently for the cause of 
the New Navy, but two of its members, Senator Eugene 
Hale and Congressman Charles Boutelle, also successful­
ly steered the administration’s naval appropriations bills 
through Congress. Maine’s only steel shipbuilding plant, 
the newly-founded Bath Iron Works, built three of the 
New Navy’s vessels during this administration. In addi­
tion, the state’s major newspapers added their support to 
the creation of a strong naval force in repeated editor­
ials. Indeed, Maine’s role in advocacy and even in actual 
construction was an important factor in the creation of 
the modern United States Navy.
Congressional Activity
There was a general interest in naval policy attendant 
upon the Republican return to power in 1889. Republi­
cans by tradition and association were pro-Navy, and 
Benjamin Harrison was no exception. He was an outspo­
ken advocate of a regenerated navy.1 President Harrison 
selected an able Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Tracy, 
who was to be most influential in furthering the New 
Navy cause. Harrison and Tracy had the benefit of clear 
Republican majorities in both branches of the Fifty-first 
Congress. Although the party’s House majority was 
small, it was under the firm hand of the Speaker, 
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Thomas B. Reed of Portland, Maine, who throughout the 
1880s had been a consistent advocate of naval expan­
sion.2 In addition to Republican Congressional majorities, 
the return of Augusta, Maine’s James G. Blaine as Secre­
tary of State was an indirect boon to the New Navy. 
Blaine’s aggressive foreign policy pronouncements, espec­
ially his denunciation of European control of the pro­
posed inter-isthmian canal, focused public attention on 
the divergence of American and European interests. 
Blaine’s pronouncements also encouraged imperious de­
mands for a navy to put teeth into national policies, no­
tably the Monroe Doctrine.3
Maine’s all-Republican Congressional delegation was a 
bulwark of support for the administration’s naval policy. 
Both Senators William Frye of Lewiston and Eugene 
Hale of Turner, the second ranking member of the Sen­
ate Naval Affairs Committee, voted consistently to 
strengthen and modernize the Navy. Of Maine’s four 
Representatives, three likewise were steady friends of 
the New Navy policy. Joining Speaker Reed in voting 
regularly for a big navy was Nelson Dingley of Durham, 
a member of the newly-created Committee of Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries. Charles Boutelle of Bangor, Chair­
man of the House Naval Affairs Committee in the Fif­
ty-first Congress and ranking minority committeeman in 
the Fifty-second, was probably the most vocal advocate 
of naval expansion in the House. The fourth Representa­
tive, Seth Milliken of Montville, was invariably absent 
from crucial naval votes, though on one occasion he chal­
lenged the anti-New Navy remarks of an Indiana Con­
gressman.4 In short, the Maine Congressional delegation 
was a solid supporter of the New Navy cause.
Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle in particular 
were key figures in the rise of the New Navy. Both men 
were well qualified for their important committee posts. 
Hale had declined the Navy portfolio in the Hayes ad­
ministration but had remained actively involved in naval 
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affairs. Boutelle, a shipmaster in his earlier years, was a 
captain in the U.S. Navy during the Civil War, participat­
ing in the capture of Mobile and commanding naval 
forces in the Mississippi Sound.5 With their skillful com­
mittee work, forceful arguments, and passionate debate, 
Hale and Boutelle successfully steered the Naval Appro­
priations Bill of 1890, the first ‘battleship bill’ in the na­
tion s history, through Congress. In authorizing “three sea­
going coast-line battleships of about 8,500 tons displace­
ment” the Bill set the United States upon the alluring 
path of sea power and provided a naval basis for the ag­
gressive foreign policy of the 1890s.6 In view of the im­
portance of this piece of legislation and of the vital role 
that Hale and Boutelle played in its passage, the events 
leading to and the actual Congressional debates on this 
bill require detailed analysis.
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy’s first annual re­
port given in December of 1889 was the first real step to­
ward the creation of a modem battleship navy. In the re­
port Tracy outlined a “defensive” naval policy. Tradition­
ally that meant fast cruiser squadrons for purposes of 
commerce raiding. But the Secretary proposed a quite 
different navy, one with, in contemporary jargon, a de­
terrent first-strike capability. Tracy called for the crea­
tion of two battlefield fleets, an Atlantic fleet consisting 
of twelve battleships and Pacific fleet of eight. In addi­
tion he requested sixty fast cruisers to be used in a 
guerre de course (or commerce warfare) strategy and 
twenty monitor-type vessels for coast defense.7 The Sec­
retary of the Navy worked closely with Senator Hale in 
preparing this report, hoping that the Maine legislator’s 
influence would lead to rapid Congressional action. To 
implement such a far-reaching and inherently long-range 
policy, Tracy asked Congress for an immediate start on 
eight battleships (which represented his estimate of avail­
able shipyard capacity) as well as five torpedo boats and 
a continuation of the cruiser-building program.8
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Tracys annual report was soon followed by an even 
more remarkable document, the report of the Naval Pol­
icy Board. An ad hoc committee of six naval officers had 
been appointed by Tracy to study the nation’s naval re­
quirements. Taking a broad view of its commission, the 
Board outlined a program that suited a Mahanian con­
cept of sea power but was by no means practical in 
terms of current requirements.9 Like many other investi­
gators, the Board considered the existing naval establish­
ment totally inadequate. “Our navy is insignificant,” it as­
serted, “and totally disproportionate to the greatness of 
the country and to the task which would certainly fall to 
it in case of war.”10 Yet unlike others, the Board con­
sidered a massive naval construction program as the only 
remedy. It recommended an incredible 200 ships: 40 bat­
tleships, 40 cruisers, 117 torpedo craft, and 11 rams.
Completely ignoring potential international repercus­
sions as well as domestic political realities, the Navy Pol­
icy Boards report was soundly denounced by both 
friends and foes of the New Navy. Senator Hale, for ex­
ample, responded to a critic’s remarks that associated 
New Navy legislation with the Board’s report.
The officers of that board were able and competent and skillful men 
in their profession, but they were seized and possessed with the idea 
that the one thing for the American government to do was to build 
up an enormous navy equal to that of the nations of the Old World. 
Nobody else that I know of is in favor of that.11
As a result of the Board’s startling report, a fear of un­
restrained navalism gripped Congress, obviously the re­
verse effect from that intended by Tracy. The Naval Af­
fairs committees promptly cut the Navy Secretary’s origi­
nal proposal down to three coastal battleships, one cruis­
er, and a torpedo boat. Because of the cost factor in­
volved, even this comparatively modest bill faced consid­
erable opposition. The three battleships proposed in the 
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Naval Appropriations Bill of 1890 were estimated to cost 
about four million dollars each, nearly treble the amount 
earmarked for new naval construction during the preced­
ing year and roughly equal to the amount allocated for 
new construction for the years 1883 through 1888.12 
There was, therfore, considerable debate in Congress on 
this piece of legislation. And during the extended debate 
Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle successfully 
championed the New Navy’s cause and, thereby, helped 
to secure passage of the first battleship legislation in the 
nation’s history.13
Although much of the discussion on the Naval Appro­
priations Bill focused on matters of naval technology 
(e.g., cruising ranges, gunnery, and naval architecture), 
Senator Hale became involved in debating the basic 
questions of the necessity for a modern navy. Referring 
to America’s potential power as a sufficient deterrent to 
war, Senator Francis Marion Cockrell, a Missouri Demo­
crat, viewed a naval renaissance as totally unnecessary. 
Maine’s Hale countered this argument by noting that 
only an actual naval force (similar to the Mahanian con­
cept of a “fleet in being”) would act as a deterrent and 
preventive to war. Mere undeveloped potential, Hale 
contended, was only a temptation:
Give the small man the pistol, the rifle, the bowie knife and he will at­
tack the large man, if he knows that the large man has not weapons 
and he wants to do him mischief; but arm the large man, the peaceful 
man, the quiet man, with the same weapons the other man has, and 
there will never be a step toward a conflict. The two men will live to­
gether in antagonism, it may be quarrel all their lives, but there will 
be no breach of peace.lif
The Senator often repeated this theme of naval prepared­
ness as a deterrent to war. America in a state of unpre­
paredness only invited belligerence from the stronger 
powers.15
Most of the Congressional debate on the naval bill, 
however, did not focus on the need for the New Navy. 
Only a few legislators opposed the general notion of 
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strengthening and modernizing the country’s naval arm. 
But no real consensus existed as to the pace, method, or 
procedure of the proposed naval regeneration. Many 
Democrats favored the small-navy tradition of Jefferson 
and Jackson.16 Even more Congressmen were oriented in 
the traditional continentalist naval policy of coast de­
fense and commerce warfare. They questioned spending 
millions on limited range battleships when, in their esti­
mation, money could be spent more wisely on swift 
cruisers and shore defenses. As a result of this diver­
gence of opinion, Hale and Boutelle spent most of their 
time attempting to demonstrate the necessity for battle­
ship construction.
Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle effectively de­
fended battleship construction. The Maine Senator pic­
tured America in 1890 as being at the proverbial cross­
roads. The nation had the choice of continuing to build 
only cruisers and gunboats or of constructing genuine 
“fighting ships”. Should the United States, queried Hale, 
be without a single ship capable of maintaining and de­
fending its rights at home and abroad?17 He argued that 
the nation did not need cruisers or gunboats but battle­
ships. Only a battleship could break a blockade of the 
coastlines. A blockade, the Senator contended, “would 
press with its tremendous congesting force upon every 
State in this Union”. In the event of such a state of af­
fairs any legislator who opposed battleship bills might as 
well “call on the rocks and mountains to hide them from 
the indignation of the American people.”18 Boutelle 
stated that battleships were an imperative for enabling a 
modern navy to resist “aggression when it comes in its 
most formidable shape.” Only a battleship could encoun­
ter successfully anything that rival powers could send 
against the country.19 The Bangor Congressman admitted 
that the Navy’s cruisers had the capability of wreaking 
considerable havoc with the commerce of European 
powers, especially that of Great Britain. But, he added,
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What a spectacle, I say, we should present in chasing English mer­
chantmen on the Pacific and South Atlantic and having half a dozen 
British ironclads anchored in New York harbor and in the other great 
ports in our coast, placing an embargo on the centers of business of 
our country and perhaps repeating the destruction of the national 
Capital itself.20
America’s first step toward sea power, the Naval Ap­
propriations Bill of 1890, passed both the House and Sen­
ate with votes of 131 to 105 and 33 to 18, respectively.21 
Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle must receive a 
large portion of the credit for the successful passage of 
the Bill.22 Even a cursory glance at the Congressional de­
bates reveals that the two Maine legislators were the 
chief sponsors and spokesmen for this naval legislation.23 
Yet despite his enthusiastic advocacy of the Bill, Hale 
felt that it was far too modest. The Senator did not in­
tend for the Bill to be the last word in naval construction 
legislation. During the heat of the debate he stated quite 
frankly that the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1890 was 
only a beginning. “All that is sought in this bill is to be­
gin,” Hale contended, “and it is only a beginning. I say 
frankly it is only a beginning. It is not intended to stop 
here.”24
The Naval Appropriations Act of 1890 was undoubted­
ly the most important naval legislation of the Harrison 
administration. Naval appropriations in 1891 and 1892 
provided for only one additional battleship, the Iowa, 
and two cruisers, the Minneapolis and the Brooklyn. 
Such appropriations were decidedly anti-climactic in 
comparison with the 1890 measure. Despite this apparent 
waning of New Navy enthusiasm, Hale and Boutelle con­
tinued to promote the cause of naval regeneration with 
vigor.
During the remainder of the Harrison administration 
Senator Hale directed most of his remarks toward quiet­
ing the fears of those who felt that the administration 
had embarked on a policy designed to achieve naval par­
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ity with the big powers. In February 1891 Hale stated 
that he did not believe that the nation needed, what he 
termed, an “extravagant Navy.” He claimed that he 
would be content with a relatively small but respectable 
force composed of the very best ships in the world. In 
fact, throughout these years the Senator was more con­
cerned with the quality of the Navy than its quantity.25 
In 1892, for example, he stated that the United States did 
not need a reduplication of ships in such numbers as the 
European powers. All that was essential was a naval 
force capable of providing the country with safety and 
protection from any fleet that potential adversaries 
would be likely to send to our shores.26
Likewise, Congressman Boutelle continued his advo­
cacy of the modern Navy in the latter years of the Harri­
son administration. Due to Democratic victories in the 
1890 election Boutelle was forced to relinquish his chair­
manship of the Naval Affairs Committee. But as the com­
mittee’s ranking minority member, he continued to exert 
much influence on naval matters. Gone, however, was 
the power that he once wielded. For instance, in 1892 
Boutelle introduced an amendment to the naval bill of 
that year which called for two new battleships, as op­
posed to the one that the Naval Affairs Committee had 
officially recommended. The Boutelle amendment was 
defeated, and Congress authorized only one capital 
ship.27 Increasingly, Boutelle became involved in debates 
of a partisan political nature.
the records of our legislation shows [claimed Boutelle] that the 
rebuilding of the Navy up to the present time is due to the votes of 
the Republican party in this House, and has been accomplished at 
every contested point in spite of the opposition of a majority of the 
votes of the Democratic Representative.28
The Maine Congressman seemed as intent upon bestow­
ing credit for what progress had been made in rebuild­




Like the Maine Congressional delegation, Maine’s ma­
jor newspapers favored the naval renaissance of the 
Harrison administration. Numerous editorials supported 
the New Navy cause consistently. The papers carried 
literally hundreds of articles and news clips on nearly 
every aspect of naval affairs: naval technology, foreign 
naval developments, and the launching of the various ves­
sels of the new United States Navy. For example, the 
Bangor Daily Whig and Courier carried ten editorials and 
articles on naval matters in the month of October 1889. 
And in April 1890, while Congress debated the Naval Ap­
propriations Bill, the paper printed nine ‘naval items’. 
Portland’s Daily Eastern Argus not only reported faith­
fully major naval developments and printed several edi­
torials in support of the New Navy, but also carried de­
tailed sketches of each major Navy vessel upon comple­
tion.29
Such extensive journalistic coverage of naval affairs 
and support for the New Navy was to be expected, 
since most of the state’s major newspapers were staunch­
ly pro-Republican (some having intimate connections 
with prominent Republican politicians). Secretary of 
State James G. Blaine had at one time owned a major in­
terest in the Augusta newspaper, the Kennebec Journal. 
None other than Congressman Charles Boutelle owned 
controlling interest in the intensely partisan Bangor Daily 
Whig and Courier.30 The Lewiston Evening Journal was 
also a pro-Republican paper, most friendly to its favorite 
son, Senator William Frye. Even the Democratic Daily 
Eastern Argus was just as pro-Navy as the Republican pa­
pers, differing only on points of method and procedure.31
All the papers agreed that the existing naval establish­
ment was grossly inadequate. For example, the Lewis­
ton Evening Journal in an 1890 editorial, entitled “Our 
Navy To-Day”, noted the smallness and inefficiency of 
the Navy and bemoaned the fact that the wooden ves- 
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seis were becoming unserviceable faster than new vessels 
could be authorized and built.32 The Portland Argus a 
year earlier took a similar stance: “The new warships 
were being built none too soon, for the old ones are 
rapidly losing the little value they ever had in compari­
son with the modem armaments of other nations.”33 The 
Argus also reprinted a Baltimore Sun editorial which ar­
gued that several of the weaker naval powers had the po­
tential to “swoop down upon us at any moment and 
devastate the coast from Maine to Florida.” The same 
editorial also depicted another hypothetical situation that 
might be the result of naval unpreparedness: “a single 
powerful iron-clad could levy upon our cities, within a 
very few days . . . [great sums of money], leaving us 
equally liable to another attack at any time. . . .”34
Once having noted the fact of the nation’s naval inade­
quacy and having indicated some of the potentially dire 
consequences of remaining in such a condition, the 
Maine newspapers called for the rebuilding of the na­
tion’s naval force to remedy the situation. The Argus 
stated that although the nation was at peace, the United 
States with its commercial and economic prosperity was 
not without its potential rivals. The nation, therefore, 
should go on with the work of rebuilding the Navy in ad­
dition to strengthening the fortifications of prominent 
coastal cities, Portland included.35 The Kennebec Journal 
observed that the general sentiment of the American peo­
ple favored a reasonable increase in the Navy. However, 
the Journal reminded its readers that rebuilding the 
Navy would take time due to the “magnitude and nature 
of the work required in putting to sea such a fleet of war 
vessels as the nation demands.”36 The 27 May 1890 issue 
of the Kennebec Journal printed probably the most rep­
resentative Maine editorial favoring the naval renais­
sance. Echoing Senator Hale, the editorial stated that a 
strong naval defense was essential to the preservation of 
peace. The Journal remarked that in the event of a war 
with Britain, the chief naval power of the nineteenth cen­
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tury, the “utterly defenceless” American commerce 
would be swept from the seas. The editorial concluded 
by noting that “the people of Maine, with its more than 
2,000 miles of coast should for obvious reasons be inter­
ested in the building up of a strong navy by the general 
government. . . .”37
Maine’s major newspapers were in unison in their advo­
cacy of a stronger naval arm. But there were differences 
which were roughly manifested along partisan political 
lines. Yet the newspapers generally did not equate the 
cause of naval expansion with any particular party. Bou­
telle s Bangor Daily Whig and Courier was the most signi­
ficant exception to this general rule. Repeatedly, the Ban­
gor paper accused the Democratic party with obstruct­
ing naval progress. It attributed most, if not all, the suc­
cess in rebuilding the Navy to the Republican party. In 
April 1890 the Bangor Whig reprinted a Cincinnati editor­
ial which stated that the Democrats’ failure to sustain the 
nation’s maritime prowess “should incite Republican zeal 
in behalf of that branch of our military service that has 
shed so much glory upon our country and its flag.”38 A 
reprinted Philadelphia editorial, “How the Navy was 
Built”, attributed current naval construction to the will­
ingness of Republican Congressmen to allot funds to the 
naval program and stated that if the Republican Senate 
had taken the course of the Democratic House in Cleve­
land’s first administration, there would be no New Navy 
at all.39 Just after Congress defeated Boutelle’s amend­
ment to the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1892, the Ban­
gor Whig alleged that the Democrats, with their “unpa­
triotic and sectional instincts”, had checked the progress 
of naval construction, leaving the “rich seaboard cities of 
the United States without adequate defence from hostile 
attack.”40
The Bangor Whig generously publicized the contribu­
tions made by its owner, Representative Boutelle, on be­
half of the New Navy. When Boutelle was appointed
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Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, the 
Whig printed four items from other newspapers which 
heaped lavish praise on the Maine Congressman.41 Bou- 
telle’s newspaper reprinted a New York Tribune editor­
ial that said Congressman Boutelle “deserves great credit 
for the industry and success with which he has conduct­
ed .. . [the Naval Affairs Committee’s] investiga­
tions. . . .” The Whig also printed a letter written by 
Congressman J.P. Dolliver, an Iowa Republican, which 
contended that “the country is first of all indebted to the 
well trained foresight and practical wisdom of Chairman 
Boutelle” for the passage of the Naval Appropriations 
Bill of 1890. Many more instances of this type of 
‘pat-on-the-back’ journalism were evidenced in the pages 
of the Bangor Whig. Undoubtedly, the Maine citizen 
who read solely this paper would conclude that Charles 
Boutelle single-handedly brought about the naval regene­
ration and, thereby, saved the nation.
Maine citizens were exposed to the New Navy cause 
in ways other than newspaper editorials and reprinted 
speeches of their Congressmen. Portlanders, for instance, 
packed a local theater in December 1892 to see “A.Y. 
Pearson’s Big Patriotic and Spectacular Drama, ‘The 
White Squadron.’ ” The Eastern Argus carried elaborate 
advertisements, complete with a large picture of a mod­
em cruiser of the famous White Squadron. The Argus re­
view of the play described immense crowds and thunder­
ous ovations at the “emphatically patriotic drama.”42 Resi­
dents of the Bangor-Bar Harbor area, however, had the 
opportunity to view the real thing in late August 1891. 
The United States Navy staged its spectacular grand na­
val review off Bar Harbor. The highlight of the review 
was a mock naval battle between the White Squadron 
and the North Atlantic Squadron. All told, ten of the 
Navy’s best cruisers participated. Secretary Tracy head­
ed the list of dignitaries present to witness the gala af­
fair. Congressman Boutelle dramatically arrived at Bar 
Harbor in the new cruiser Vesuvius to join the festivities, 
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while many other Bangor inhabitants took special excur­
sion trains to the coast.43
Naval Construction
The state of Maine was able to achieve tangible eco­
nomic benefits from the New Navy agitation of the Har­
rison administration, namely contracts to build three na­
val vessels at Bath Iron Works. In early August 1889 a 
representative of Secretary Tracy inspected the new­
ly-founded Bath Iron Works in order to ascertain whe­
ther the institution could serve as a nucleus for a govern­
ment naval station (a base where steel vessels could be 
both constructed and repaired). Although the representa­
tive announced that he was favorably impressed with the 
new firm and the town of Bath, for some reason the na­
val station was established elsewhere.44 Less than a 
month later Bath was host to President Harrison and Sec­
retary Tracy along with most of the Maine Congressional 
delegation. Harrison and Tracy spent the better part of a 
day inspecting the town’s shipbuilding plants, especially 
Bath Iron Works.45 In November of that same year the 
Bath firm made an unsuccessful bid on a cruiser con­
tract. But this did not dampen the spirits of the Bath peo­
ple, as a Bath Times editorial indicated:
Bath will keep a-bidding till she gets iron ships to build. There is no 
doubt about that. The future is destined to see a good many iron 
ships constructed in America, and Bath is to have her share.46
Finally in late February 1890 the optimistic predictions 
were realized when Bath Iron Works was awarded its 
first contracts for two steel gunboats at a price of 
$318,500 apiece.47 The gunboats were hybrid vessels with 
both steam and sail propulsion. They were lightly ar­
mored craft of about one thousand tons displacement, 
sporting six four-inch breech-loading rifles for their main 
armament.48 Amid much fanfare the first gunboat was 
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launched on 8 December 1891, christened by Ethel 
Hyde, daughter of General Hyde, the President of Bath 
Iron Works. She was named the Machias in honor of the 
first naval engagement of the War for American Indepen­
dence. The Machias’ sistership, the Castine, was 
launched on 10 May 1892. The two gunboats were the 
first steel warships ever to be built in the state of Maine.49
The Lewiston Journal saw in the two gunboat con­
tracts the seeds of a permanent steel shipbuilding indus­
try in Maine, an industry that had the potential of becom­
ing one of the state’s leading employers: “Steadily, sure­
ly, Maine is moving ahead. A great industrial future is be­
fore her.”50 Although these words are somewhat prophe­
tic, the prophecy was not fulfilled during the Harrison 
administration. The Bath Works continued to bid for 
Navy contracts. In July 1891 the firm made the lowest 
bid on a proposed fast cruiser but lost the contract to the 
well-established Philadelphia firm of Cramp and Sons, 
which was already building an exact duplicate of the 
cruiser. Bath admitted that it could not complete the 
ship within the two year contract limit, whereas Cramp 
and Sons claimed they could build it in six months less 
time. In addition, the difficulty of constructing the pro­
posed vessel made Navy Department officials wary of 
awarding the contract to the new and relatively inexper­
ienced firm.51 Yet the Iron Works’ low bid not only 
forced Cramp and Sons to lower their first bid but also 
gained for the firm a national reputation as a builder of 
large warships of exceptional speed competitive with the 
famous Philadelphia concern 52 Bath Iron Works received 
only one additional contract during the Harrison adminis­
tration. It was for the experimental L7.S.S. Katahdin, a 
low-lying, cigar-shaped vessel armed only with a massive 
pointed ram. The unique vessel was never imitated.53
The Chilean Affair: A New Navy Vindication
During the Harrison administration an actual diploma­
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tic crisis developed from which the naval expansionists, 
heretofore using theoretical and hypothetical arguments, 
claimed that their efforts for naval regeneration had 
been vindicated. On 16 October 1891 two American blue­
jackets were killed and sixteen injured during a street 
brawl in Valparaiso, Chile. Secretary of State Blaine, un­
willing to jeopardize his Pan-American and reciprocity 
policies, was inclined to treat the incident as of minor sig­
nificance.54 President Harrison, however, regarded the in­
cident as an attack of grave importance. In late Decem­
ber and early January after much diplomatic maneuver­
ing, the situation became quite serious. Chilean naval 
forces held naval exercises in Valparaiso harbor, using 
the anchored American cruiser Yorktown as a target for 
mock torpedo boat attacks. War preparations were made 
in both countries, and by mid-January a conflict seemed 
inevitable. Matters came to a head on 21 January 1892 
when Blaine sent an ultimatum, xvorded by Harrison, to 
the Chileans demanding an apology and reparations. 
Five days later the Chilean government sent an apology; 
reparations followed subsequently.55 The United States 
had come ever so close to a naval conflict with Chile, a 
small, but by no means, insignificant naval power.
Maine’s two foremost naval advocates, Senator Hale 
and Congressman Boutelle, did not fail to cite the Chil­
ean affair as a vindication of their naval expansion argu­
ments. In an interview with a New York newspaper cor­
respondent during the height of the crisis, Senator Hale 
was asked what would have been the result of the cur­
rent dispute with Chile had the United States no navy 
“to back up our demands for a proper course of con­
duct.” Hale replied that were the Navy in the state it 
was a few years before, “Chile could have blustered at us 
as much as she pleased and we would have been power­
less to say a word.” The Maine Senator again raised the 
specter of hostile ships bombarding helpless American 
cities. Hale concluded by stating that the Chilean affair 
to date had confirmed his belief in the necessity of a 
198
strong navy. “I think our people appreciate this fact”, he 
claimed, “and I believe they all rejoice that we are now 
in a position to assert our national self respect.”56
In Congress Senator Hale reiterated his belief that the 
recent steps toward rebuilding the Navy had saved the 
country from profound embarrassment during the Chil­
ean crisis. The New Navy had spared the nation the hu­
miliation of being “bully-ragged by a little South Ameri­
can power . . [, for Chile] would have had its hand at
our throats and we would have been at its mercy.” He 
ended his speech by warning that the nation could ex­
pect similar incidents and must, therefore, be prepared: 
We are coming nearer to other people, forming commercial alliances, 
and entanglements may come about at any time We can not 
count upon that exemption from trouble, danger, and war [that] we 
have been counting upon for the last twenty-five years.57
Likewise, Congressman Boutelle did not miss the op­
portunity to draw conclusions from the Chilean affair. 
He viewed the crisis as “a demonstration of the incalcul­
able benefit conferred upon this country by the develop­
ment of our Navy. . . .” Boutelle maintained that had 
the nation been in the state of naval unpreparedness of 
several years before, San Francisco might have been 
bombarded or New York “might have been put under 
tribute or partially destroyed by so comparatively insigni­
ficant a power as Chile.” But the United States, Boutelle 
proclaimed, did have the nucleus of a modern navy. Sec­
retary Tracy was able “by the click of the telegraph . 
[to] set in motion . a naval force under the flag of 
our country adequate to the maintenance of the dignity 
of and honor of the United States . . .”58 Boutelle, like 
Hale, did not favor a retreat from American commercial 
expansion in foreign nations in order to minimize the pos­
sibility of similar incidents occurring in the future. Ra­
ther, he advocated an adequate naval establishment to 
protect and uphold American citizens and interest 
abroad.59
Maine’s Republican newspapers wholeheartedly 
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agreed with Harrison’s handling of the Chilean affair. 
But only the Kennebec Journal actually linked the events 
of the incident with the New Navy cause. In an editorial, 
entitled “The Lesson of the Chilean Affair”, the Journal 
noted, in words nearly identical to those of Hale and 
Boutelle, that without the New Navy Chile easily could 
have “laid low” the nation’s coastal cities. Sounding very 
much like Boutelle’s Bangor Whig, the Augusta paper 
took this opportunity7 to strike out against the Democrats: 
“If the peanut statesmen of the Democratic party had 
continued in uninterrupted power to the present day the 
United States would not have been in position to have 
demanded apology and reparation. . . The editorial 
concluded by citing the Chilean affair as ample justifica­
tion for “energetically pushing forward the work of 
building up our new navy.”60
Unlike the Republican newspapers, the Portland East­
ern Argus violently opposed the Harrison administra­
tion’s handling of the Chilean crisis. While other Maine 
newspapers demanded that America resort to war should 
the Chileans refuse to apologize and make reparations, 
the Argus argued that war was both not in the nation’s 
best interest and morally unjustifiable. A war with Chile, 
the Argus maintained, would involve the United States in 
complications with Britain and hence expose American 
shipping and coastal cities to the over-powering might of 
the Royal Navy. A war with Chile would also discredit 
the nation in the eyes of many of the South American re­
publics, to the benefit of the country’s European rivals. 
The Argus also attacked the view that war was in the 
people’s interest. On the contrary, protested the Argus, 
the people are invariably “the chief sufferers” in war. 
The nation simply was not justified in going to war over 
“a drunken sailors’ brawl.”61
When the Chilean crisis passed, the Republican news­
papers of Maine praised the administration’s tough stand. 
One even noted the relationship of the naval renaissance 
200
with aggressive, even belligerent, foreign policy. Breath­
ing a sigh of relief at the news of a peaceful settlement, 
the Eastern Argus, on the other hand, printed a poem by 
Fitz Nigel, “No War with Chile”, one stanza of which 
read as follows:
Yes, by jingo!
I know you’re all 
Cocked and primed 
For a row 
And that’s what’s the matter. 
The big guns, big ships, 
Devlish torpedoes, 
Patent armor plates, etc., 
Have turned your head 
Also the little heads 
Of the little naval roosters 
Who want to be Admirals 
But we shan’t have no war 62
Maine and the New Navy, 1889-1893
During the Harrison administration the state of Maine 
almost unanimously supported the New Navy. Only one 
example of opposition to the cause of rebuilding the 
Navy has been found. The North Berwick Society of 
Friends meeting petitioned the Fifty-first Congress 
against increased expenditures for naval construction and 
coast defense.63 Such sentiment was most rare, for the 
state was intimately involved in the naval revival. 
Maine’s Congressional delegation not only supported 
New Navy legislation, but also provided the cause with 
its national leadership. The great significance of the Na­
val Appropriations Act of 1890 for the future develop­
ment of the Navy underlines the importance of the role 
played by Senator Hale and Congressman Boutelle. 
Maine’s major newspapers supported naval expansion 
and, no doubt, created or reinforced considerable pro-na­
val sentiment in their readers. The state of Maine, in ad­
dition to its contributions to the legislative and popular 
roots of the modem American naval arm, also contri­
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buted three new ships to the growing list of commis­
sioned vessels in the United States Navy. And, as the 
Chilean episode demonstrated, the state of Maine, on the 
whole, linked the New Navy with the strategic impera­
tives of an emerging world power.
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